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SEXUALITY, PRIVACY AND
THE NEW BIOLOGY
GEORGE P. SMITH II*
ROBERTO IRAOLA**
Man's "mischievous animal magnetism"' has begun to
give way to alternative methods of human conception, such
as artificial insemination2 and in vitro fertilization.' Within
the foreseeable future, the "new biology's" perfection of
techniques such as cloning4 and parthenogenesis5 may lead
* B.S., Indiana University, 1961; J.D. Indiana University, 1964; Professor of
Law, The Catholic University of America.
** B.A., The Catholic University of America, 1979; J.D. The Catholic University
of America, 1983; Judicial Clerk, District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
1. Turano, Paternity by Proxy, AM. MERCURY, Apr. 1938, at 418, 419 (predicting
artificial insemination would become accepted in pathological cases, and be resorted
to by a few feminists and "Lucy Stoners").
2. Artificial insemination is defined as "the introduction of the male semen into
the vagina for the sake of procreation by any means other than the act of copulation
.... " GuttmacherArt_0cialInsemination, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 566, 566 (1969). It
is by no means an innovative or untested practice. See W. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION 5-7 (2d ed. 1976); H. ROHLEDER, TEST TUBE BABIES 30-44 (1934).
The first successful human artificial inseminations were performed in England by
Dr. John Hunter in 1799 and in the United States by Dr. J. Marion Sims in 1866. H.
DAVIS, ARTIFICIAL HUMAN FECUNDATION 8 (1951); G. VALENSIN, THE QUESTION OF
FERTILITY 11-12 (1960).
3. In vitro fertilization is the fertilization of an ovum in the laboratory and its
subsequent implantation in the uterus, where it will develop into a fetus and grow
until it is born. Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Conundrums,
64 GEO. L.J. 697, 708 (1976). The first baby to be fertilized in vitro was born in
England on July 25, 1978. Comment,Artficial Human Reproduction: Legal Problems
Presented by the Test Tube Baby, 28 EMORY L.J. 1045, 1048 n.19 (1979). In Decem-
ber, 1981, the United States joined England and Australia and produced its first test
tube baby. America's First Test-Tube Baby, SCI. NEws, Jan. 2, 1982, at 7.
For a discussion of the use of an artificial uterus to develop embryonic life, other-
wise known as ectogenesis, see D. RORVIK, BRAVE NEW BABY 78-84 (1971). See also
Grobstein, The Moral Uses of 'Spare' Embryos, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1982,
at 5; Branigin, Frozen Embryos Trigger Debate by Australians, Wash. Post, May 17,
1983, at A1, col. 6; Doctors Say Frozen Egg Produces Pregnancy, Wash. Post, May 3,
1983, at A14, col. 2; Amazing Birth, TIME, Jan. 23, 1984, at 30 (discussing the birth of
the world's first donor egg baby fertilized in a Petri dish by the husband's sperm and
subsequently implanted in his wife's uterus).
4. Several steps would be required to clone a human. First, the nucleus of a
donor's egg cell would be destroyed. A nucleus from any convenient cell of
the person to be cloned would be inserted into the enucleated egg by
microsurgical techniques not yet fully developed. The new cell, placed in a
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
to an asexual mode of human reproduction. While not
enough is known about the latter techniques "to allow dog-
matizing concerning whether [they] should or should not be
undertaken,' 6 the emergence and practical implementation
of the former modes of human reproduction leave no doubt
that they may be viewed not as a mere component of a
Huxleian view of the future, but rather as a major scientific
force for tomorrow.7
A number of commentators have observed that either the
liberalization of state adoption laws, coupled with the libera-
tion of women, or the fundamental constitutional rights of
privacy and procreation" may establish the right of unmar-
ried women to be artificially inseminated 9 or to participate
in the process of surrogation and become surrogate
nutrient medium, would begin to divide and embryo implantation would fol-
low in approximately four to six days. The cloned individual would be the
identical twin of the person who contributed the body cell.
Smith, supra note 3, at 711-12 (footnotes omitted). See also Note,AsexualReproduc-
tion and Genetic Engineering: A Constitutional Assessment of the Technology of Clon-
ing, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 476, 481-87 (1974).
5. In this form of asexual reproduction, "[t]he male sperm is supplanted by a
chemical or electrical stimulus which causes the female cell to begin reproducing. All
offspring born of this procedure would, therefore, necessarily be female." Comment,
supra note 3, at 1046 n.5 (citing Kindregan, State Power Over Human Fertility and
Individual Liberty, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1401, 1418-19 (1972)). See also Host-Mothers
TIME, Apr. 6, 1936, at 49 (discussing experiments on rabbits performed by Dr. Greg-
ory G. Pincus, a physiologist at Harvard, who soaked some rabbit ova in brine, and
heated other ova to 113 degrees Fahrenheit, about 10 degrees above normal, and,
after placing all the ova in the fallopian tubes of different rabbits, discovered they
became pregnant).
6. Smith, supra note 3, at 713.
7. See Smith, The Medicolegal Challenge of Preparing For a Brave, Yet Somewhat
Frightening New World, J. LEGAL MED., Apr. 1977, at 9-10. See generally Fried-
mann, Interference with Human Lie: Some Jurisprudential Rflections, 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 1058 (1970); Lederberg, The Freedoms and the Control of Science: Notesfrom the
Ivory Tower, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 596 (1972).
S. See infra text accompanying notes 86-131.
9. See generally Annas, Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best Interest of the
Sperm Donor, 14 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1980); Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to
Artificial Insemination: A Call/or an Expanded Defnition of Family, 4 HARV. WO-
MEN'S L.J. 1, 26-39 (1981); Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artficial Insemination, 18 J.
FAM. L. 331, 344-46 (1979); Comment, Artiicial Insemination and Surrogate Mother-
hood- A Nursery Full of Unresolved Questions, 17 WILLAMETTE L.J. 913, 935 (1981).
See also Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 405-36 (1983).
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mothers.10
This article will present an argumentative analysis show-
ing that unmarried women have no fundamental right to ar-
tificial insemination and that statutes limiting artificial
insemination to married women1 ' are reasonable and reflect
sound public policy considerations. Furthermore, statutes
which might seek to legitimize the status of surrogate
mothers could undermine fundamental policies which recog-
nize the family as the very essence of societal strength and
well-being. The purpose of this article, then, is not to ex-
plore the complex legal and ethical dimensions of the new
reproductive biology. Rather, only one aspect of this process
is to be examined: the process of artificially inseminating
unmarried women for either their own personal purposes of
pregnancy without marriage or as surrogates for infertile
women. Surrogation will be evaluated only as an analytic
complement to the sexual privacy 2 of women who are ex-
pressing their sexual freedom through unconventional (arti-
ficial) means to become pregnant.
I. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
A. Overview
There are three kinds of artificial insemination (Al): (1)
artificial insemination with the husband's sperm, referred to
as homologous artificial insemination (AIH);13 (2) artificial
insemination by a donor, referred to as heterologous artifi-
10. See Brophy,.4 Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263
(1981-1982); Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L. Rnv. 611 (1978);
Comment, Surrogate Motherhood in California: Legislative Proposals, 18 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 341 (1981).
11. See infra note 36 (listing insemination statutes by state).
12. See Eichbaum, Lovisi v. Slayton: Constitutional Privacy and Sexual Expres-
sion, 10 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 525 (1978-79); Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980); Richards, UnnaturalActs and the Constitutional
Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1977); Wilkinson &
White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 563
(1977).
13. A number of physical difficulties may impede a couple from conceiving by
normal sexual intercourse. The husband, for example, may suffer from retrograde
ejaculation, physical impotence, malformation of the penis, obesity or low fertility.
Likewise, impediments to conception in the wife may include vaginal tumors or scar-
ring, an abnormal position of the uterus, a very small cervical opening, or obesity.
19841
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cial insemination (AID);14 and (3) artificial insemination
through a combination of the donor's and the husband's
sperm (AIC).' 5 Although the reasons which lead to this
form of reproduction may vary from case to case, AI re-
mains a simple medical procedure in which a syringe is in-
serted into a woman's vagina and semen is released toward
the opening of the uterus. 16
Traditionally considered an alternative to adoption17 and
permissible only within the marital relationship, 8 AI has
See Guttmacher, supra note 2, at 569. See also Comment, supra note 9, at 916-17
n.19.
Most commentators agree that homologous insemination poses few legal
problems. See, e.g., Smith, Through .4 Test Tube Darkly: Artifcial Insemination and
the Law, 67 MICH. L. REv. 127, 128 (1968); Tucker, Legal Problems of Artiflcial In-
semination, 33 WOMEN LAW. J. 57, 58 (1947); Comment, supra note 9, at 916-17;
Note, Legal and Social Implications of Artficial Insemination, 34 IowA L. REv. 658,
661 (1949); Note, Artfcial Insemination: 4 Parvenu Intrudes on Ancient Law, 58 YALE
L.J. 457, 459 (1949).
14. Artificial insemination by an unrelated and usually unidentified donor is an
alternative to childlessness when the husband is absolutely or severely sterile. This
may also be a preferred practice when the husband is the carrier of genetic defects or
when an abnormal pregnancy is likely because of incompatible Rh blood factors.
Comment, supra note 9, at 918. See also W. FINEGOLD, supra note 2, at 18; Smith,
Great Expectations or Convoluted Realities: Artfcial Insemination in Flux, 3 FAM. L.
Rav. 37, 38 (1980).
15. Some doctors disapprove of this practice. See, e.g., Holloway, Articial In-
semination: An Examination ofthe Legal4spects, 43 A.B.A. J. 1089, 1155-56 (1957).
However, it is often used to give the husband some hope that he is fact the natural
father of the child. Shaman, supra note 9, at 332. For example, if the husband suffers
from poor sperm mobility (oligozoopermia), the combination of his sperm with that
of a donor may result in his sperm fertilizing the egg. See Comment, Therapeutic
Impregnation: Prognosis of a Lawyer - Diagnosis of a Legislature, 39 CIN. L. REv.
291, 297 (1970).
16. Shaman, supra note 9, at 333.
17. See W. FINEGOLD, supra note 2, at 23-26. But see Note, Artifcial Insemina-
tion versus 4doption, 34 VA. L. REv. 822 (1948).
18. See generally Smith, supra note 13, at 130; Comment, supra note 3, at 1050;
Note, supra note 17, at 828-29.
The Catholic Church opposes artificial insemination of any kind. See Address by
Pope Pius XII, Fourth International Convention of Catholic Doctors, Rome (Sept. 29,
1949) (cited in G. KELLY, MEDICO-MORAL PROBLEMS, 223-30 (1958)). See also W.
FrNEGOLD, supra note 2, at 79-86 (discussing the Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant
views on AI); Lombard,Artfcial Insemination-Civil Law and Ecclesiastical Views, 2
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 137, 145-47 (1968); Ryan, Noble & Friedman, Symposium on
Artifcial Insemination - The Religious Viewpoints, 7 SYRACUSE L. REv. 96, 99-106
(1955); Smith, Intrusions of a Parvenu: Science, Religion and the New Biology, 3 PACE
U.L. Rav. 63 (1982).
In 1948 the Church of England held, consistent with the followers of the Lutheran,
Jewish Orthodox and the Roman Catholic faiths, that artificial insemination was not
[Vol. 67:263
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shed its social shackles as unmarried heterosexual and les-
bian women have sought to become AI mothers.' 9 As a re-
sult, one commentator recently observed: "The use of A.I.
by unmarried women for the first time allows reproduction
to be separated from sexual activity and traditional family
life and forces the law, itself rooted in traditional values, to
face the clash between 'the power of science of human repro-
duction and traditional family values.' 20 The judicial re-
sponse to this question has been limited, but the legislatures
of twenty-two states21 have limited the practice of AI to mar-
ried women.
B. The Judicial Response
Only one reported case,22 CM.v.CC ,23 concerns the ar-
tificial insemination of an unmarried woman.24 This New
only wrong in principle but contrary to Christian beliefs. Today, because of wide-
spread use of AID, the Church of England, as represented by its clergy, is no longer
so rigid nor dogmatic in its condemnation of this process. R. Scorr, THE BODY AS
PROPERTY 202 (1981).
See generally Biomedical Ethics in Perspective of Jewish Teaching and Tradition,
PROCEEDINGS OF AN ACADEMIC CONFERENCE, November 13, 1977 (1980).
19. Kritchevsky, supra note 9, at 3. The realization that unmarried women might
be desirous of Al is by no means a new occurrence. On May 12, 1934, Newsweek
Magazine published a story discussing the success Dr. Frances I. Seymour of New
York had in artificially inseminating Mrs. Lillian Lauricella of Long Island, who had
been childless for eight years. The article also noted that in 1932 and 1933, Dr. Sey-
mour had helped to artificially impregnate thirteen women, including two profes-
sional women who wanted children but did not want to marry. Children Provided to
the Childless, NEWSWEEK, May 12, 1934, at 16. See also Substitute Fathers, NEWS-
WEEK, Sept. 13, 1943, at 87 (discussing the AI of wealthy single women who desired to
leave an heir). For a reference to recent articles in the press concerning this subject as
well as past legal literature addressing it, see Kritchevsky, supra note 9, at 3 n.10;
Comment, supra note 9, at 915 n. 11.
20. Kritchevsky, supra note 9, at 1 (citation omitted).
21. See infra note 36.
22. There has, however, been a recent suit by an unmarried woman regarding the
precise issue of an unmarried woman's right to AL. See Kritchevsky, supra note 9, at
6 n.24. See also Wadlington, Artfclal Conception: The Challenge of/Family Law, 69
VA. L. REv. 465, 493 n.ll (1983).
23. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977).
24. Initially, AID, even within marriage, was not greeted with much enthusiasm
by the judiciary. One court held that AID amounted to adultery, irrespective of the
husband's consent. See Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251 (Can. 1921). Another court
found that a child so conceived was illegitimate. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083,
242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
The modem trend contradicts these earlier positions. The legal status of the AID
child has been legitimized by the courts. See, e.g., People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280,
1984]
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Jersey case presents an unusual set of facts. C.C., an unmar-
ried woman, desired to have a child but did not want to en-
gage in premarital sex. She considered artificial conception
with friends, but C.M., whom she had dated for two years,
suggested that she use his sperm since they had often spoken
of an eventual marriage. The couple visited a local sperm
bank but were denied the use of its facilities.2 5 While con-
sulting with the doctor, however, C.C. familiarized herself
with a procedure for artificial insemination using a glass syr-
inge and a glass jar. For the next several months, C.C. made
regular visits to C.M.'s apartment for this purpose. C.M.
would stay in one room, obtain sperm, and then give it to
C.C., who would artificially inseminate herself in another
room.2 6 Conception was eventually achieved, and sometime
during the third month of her pregnancy, the pseudo-pla-
tonic relationship ended.
After C.C. gave birth, C.M. brought an action for visita-
tion rights with the child,27 asserting he was the natural fa-
ther and expressing his desire to fulfill that role.
Consequently, the parties asked the New Jersey Superior
Court to decide whether C.M. was the natural father of the
child "or whether he should be considered not to be such
because the sperm used to conceive was transferred to C.C.
by other than natural means. 28
The court refused to take a position on the propriety of
unmarried persons using artificial insemination.2 9 Nonethe-
less, it recognized public policy considerations which dic-
tated that, whenever possible, it was in the child's best
interest to have two parents °.3  Accordingly, C.M.'s petition
was granted, with an attendant responsibility for the support
and maintenance of the child.'
437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99,
345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1973). Moreover, most jurisdictions do not consider AID
adultery since it does not encompass actual sexual intercourse. Shaman, supra note 9,
at 334.
25. 152 N.J. Super. at _, 377 A.2d at 821.
26. Id. at ., 377 A.2d at 821-22.
27. Id. at , 377 A.2d at 822.
28. Id.
29. Id. at __ 377 A.2d at 825.
30. Id.
31. Id.
[Vol. 67:263
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C.M. v. C. C. cannot be said to provide precedent sup-
porting an unmarried woman's right to AI. The court could
have, but did not, justify its decision on any one of a number
of legal theories recognizing the rights and efforts of C.M. in
the insemination process such as implied contract, quasi-
contract, or estoppel. 32 Given the magnitude of the interest
at stake, the court properly shied away from basing its deci-
sion on a property or contract theory, and unequivocally rec-
ognized that the "contraband stork" 33 was no match for the
nuclear family. However, the court saw a child's interest in
having a father and mother as paramount, no matter how
the child was conceived.3 4
C. Legislative Resvonses
With a larger number of children being born each year
as a result of AID,35 the need to clarify their legal status has
become a growing concern of state legislatures. Twenty-
three states have enacted statutes36 defining the rights of
32. See Kritchevsky, supra note 9, at 15 (arguing court could have employed an
estoppel theory).
33. Turano, supra note 1, at 422.
34. 152 N.J. Super. at _, 377 A.2d at 825.
35. Six to ten thousand children are born each year in the United States as a
result of AID. Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemi-
nation by Donor in the United States, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585, 588 (1979). More-
over, it is estimated that 250,000 people in the United States have been conceived by
artificial insemination. Kritchevsky, supra note 9, at 1 n.3 (citing F. MIms & M.
SWENSON, SEXUALITY: A NURSING PERSPECTIVE 192 (1980)).
The New England Journal of Medicine article raised the real and serious concern
regarding potential for incest. It was found that sperm from one donor had been used
to produce fifty children! Obviously a possibility of accidental incest exists among
offspring who unknowingly have the same father. This article also revealed a surpris-
ing degree of sloppiness in record keeping by the participating physicians.
36. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(c) (1971);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West 1983); CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1983);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f-n, 45-152
(West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21
(1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128-130 (1981); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West
Supp. 1983); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1974); MICH. Comp. LAWS
ANN. §§ 333.2824(6), 700.111(2) (1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1981); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1979); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 49A-1 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 551-553 (West Supp. 1982-1983);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-446 (Supp. 1982); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon
1975); VA. CODE § 64.1-7.1 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (Supp. 1983);
WiS. STAT. §§ 767.47(9), 891.40(a) (1981-82); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1983).
1984]
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children born through this procedure.3 7 All of the statutes,
except Oregon's, limit the practice of AID to married wo-
men. The Oregon statute implicitly authorizes AID for un-
married women, since it provides in part: "Artificial
insemination shall not be performed upon a woman without
her prior written request and consent, and if she is married,
the prior written request and consent of her husband. '38
Nonetheless, when the statute is viewed as a whole and when
one considers that it has yet to receive any judicial construc-
tion, its legislative meaning remains uncertain. 39
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment prohibits the states from denying equal protection of
the laws to any person.4 ° Since a state statute represents
state action for equal protection analysis, a statute limiting
AID to married women must conform with constitutional
strictures or it will violate the equal protection clause. As
the analysis in part III will demonstrate, these restrictive
statutes are not amenable to constitutional attack.
II. SURROGATION
A. Definition
Simply defined, a surrogate mother is a woman (single or
married) who conceives artificially from a married man who
is not her husband. The surrogate carries a pregnancy for
the man's wife because of the wife's infertility. Upon deliv-
ery, the surrogate relinquishes all control over the child and
surrenders him or her to the contracting couple - normally
for adoption. Thus, maternal surrogation is, in reality, a log-
37. For an analysis of the common elements found in the majority of these stat-
utes, see Comment, supra note 3, at 1065-7 1. See also Schuyler, The New Biology and
the Rule Against Perpetuities, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 420, 424-28 (1968); Smith, For
Unto Us a Child is Born - Legally, 56 A.B.A. J. 143 (1970).
38. OR. REv. STAT. § 677.365(1) (1981) (emphasis added). One commentator has
recently suggested that the statutes of California, Colorado, Washington and Wyo-
ming, which follow the language of the UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5, 9A U.L.A. 592
(1979), but omit the word "married" from one of its provisions, may arguably legiti-
mize the practice for unmarried women. See Kritchevsky, supra note 9, at 18.
39. One commentator seems to have interpreted the statute as limiting the prac-
tice to married women. See Shaman, supra note 9, at 344-45.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
[Vol. 67:263
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ical counterpart to AID.4"
The surrogate mother and donor father do not partici-
pate in sexual intercourse. If a wife gives her consent to a
surrogate mother arrangement, and if a husband consents to
his wife's participation in donor insemination (AID), there is
no basis for considering adulterous the fertilization tech-
niques used to effect a pregnancy.42
None of the states have passed laws specifically regulat-
ing surrogate motherhood. Yet, a number of state statutes
make the payment to a parent for his or her consent to adopt
or obtain custody of a child unlawful;43 many impose heavy
penalties or imprisonment for violations.44 Consequently,
there is some deterrent to extensive "black market" opera-
tions in adoptions.45 Since the legality of a contract is tested
by, and depends upon, the place where it is made,46 a juris-
diction which prohibits payment for consent to adopt or for
custody of a child would hold illegal, and thus invalid, a
contract entered into between a married couple and a surro-
gate mother to relinquish the surrogate's parental rights to
an infant born for subsequent adoption by the natural father
and putative mother. Thus, the bargain is viewed in terms of
an adoption contract. If this same contractual relation is
viewed as a contract to bear a child, less objection and
greater acceptance of the contract should be recognized sim-
ply because the purchaser is the natural father of the child.
41. R. BLANK, THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN GENETIC TECHNOLOGY
68 (1981); G. SMITH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW 124-25 (1981).
42. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 ILL. U.L.J. 147, 151-52
(1980). The theological response to this phenomenon is, as with artificial insemina-
tion, to regard it as an essentially adulterous act since it is considered to be an "intru-
sion of a third party into the psycho-physical union of husband and wife."
Kavanagh, Theologians Hit "Surrogate Mother" Business, CATH. STANDARD, Apr. 8,
1982, at 33, col. 2.
43. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.590(2) (1980); MICH. CoP. LAWS ANN.
§ 710.54 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54(a) (West Supp. 1983).
44. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 181 (West 1970 & Supp. 1983) (two-, three- or
four-year imprisonment); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.69 (Supp. 1983) (misde-
meanor); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54(c) (West Supp. 1983) (high misdemeanor).
45. See, e.g., Adoption Hot Line, Inc. v. State of Florida, Dept. of Health and
Rehabilitative Servs., 385 So. 2d 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Comment, Independ-
ent Adoptions: Is the Black and White Beginning to Appear in the Controversy over
Gray-Market Adoptions?, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 629 (1980); Comment, Moppets on the
Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59 YALE L.J. 715 (1950).
46. A. CORBIN, ON CONTRACTS § 1374 (1962).
1984]
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Under the second view, fears of commercialization soften
and more attention is paid to the interests of the child and
the biological mother.47 Interestingly, an unmarried man
would encounter even less legal entanglement in dealing
with a surrogate. Since no wife would be involved, it would
be unnecessary for a man to adopt his own child. He would
simply pay the surrogate without risk and, as natural father
of the child, take custody of him or her upon birth without
the necessity of formal adoption proceedings.48
B. Presumptions of Paternity
The Uniform Parentage Act49 presents an initial obstacle
to establishing paternity in surrogate contract situations.
Section Five of the Act controls the use of artificial insemi-
nation and provides: "The donor of semen provided to a
licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a mar-
ried woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if
he were not the natuical father of a child thereby con-
ceived."' 50 It is obvious that this provision was drafted in or-
der to protect anonymous AID donors from all legal
responsibility for those children fathered through their se-
men. If the provision is adopted in toto, this language could
present difficulty for the biological father under, for exam-
ple, a surrogate contract to either establish paternity or assert
parental rights of visitation.
Children born of a valid marriage are presumed to be
legitimate issue of that union. All states, regardless of
whether they adopted the Uniform Parentage Act, recognize
this presumption.5 1 Thus, if a surrogate is married, her child
is presumed to be the legitimate child of her husband, not
the child of the sperm donor. However, the donor-biological
father could bring a custody suit and prove he was in fact the
47. Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, supra note 10, at 613.
48. Krucoff, Private Lives: The New Surrogate, Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1980, at B5,
col. 2.
49. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5(b), 9A U.L.A. 593 (1973). The Act has been
adopted in California, Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota,
Washington and Wyoming. 9A U.L.A. 171 (West Supp. 1983).
50. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5(b), 9A U.L.A. 593 (1973).
51. Annas, Contracts to Bear a Child- Compassion or Commercialism?, 11 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1981, at 24.
[Vol. 67:263
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biological father. The court would then have to determine
which parent or set of parents could better serve the long-
term needs of the child.5 2
C. Additional Policy Issues
Presumably, there is a parallel relationship between AID
and contracts to bear children. Yet, while the donor is gen-
erally assured confidentiality in heterologous insemination,
the surrogate mother's identity is generally known by the
contract couple. Her physical appearance, in fact, together
with her medical history, education level, environmental and
cultural background is often a major consideration in mak-
ing a judgment of a surrogate's suitability.-3 Thirty-five
years of age is usually the cut-off point for surrogate candi-
dacy because of the increased potential for genetic anoma-
lies in children born to women over thirty-five.
Furthermore, candidacy is normally limited to women who
are presently married or have been divorced.5 4 Single wo-
men, especially those who have never had children, are often
regarded as unsuitable simply because their involvement
would not only be regarded as promoting immorality (and
perhaps adultery), but also because their unproven record of
birth successes creates uncertainty for the contracting par-
ties. However, the right of a single, unmarried woman to
control her own physical autonomy is an evolving concept
which must be balanced against the state interest in preserv-
ing the public welfare and morals. The extent to which a
married woman can act or conduct her marital affairs with-
out the informed consent of her husband, or more specifi-
cally, her right to become a surrogate mother, also remains
an open-ended legal question.
An even more unsettled issue is the degree of control the
surrogate has over her own activities during the pregnancy.
What if, for example, after agreeing to abstain from the use
of alcoholic beverages during the pregnancy, the surrogate
52. Id. See generally Karst, supra note 12.
53. See, e.g., Harris, Stand-In Mother - Maryland Woman to Bear Child for
Couple, Wash. Post, Feb. 1I, 1980, at 1, col. 3 (recounting how a single, unmarried
twenty-year old acted in her role as a surrogate).
54. See generally Smith, A Close Encounter ofthe First Kind- Articial Insemina-
tion and an Enlightened Judiciary, 17 J. FANI. L. 41 (1978).
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does drink on a regular basis? Could a court order be ob-
tained to stop such consumption? 55  If so, how could it be
enforced? By total restraint, such as hospital confinement?
Suppose the surrogate did not reveal her propensity to con-
sume alcohol (or drugs) and the child is born with a genetic
defect determined to be the direct consequence of the surro-
gate's action. Could the surrogate be sued for negligence?
Suppose further, neither the husband nor his wife wishes to
take the defective child as his or her own and the surrogate
does not want the child. Should a penalty be assessed
against all parties because of this "misdeed"? In this situa-
tion, the infant becomes a ward of the state and, thus, a re-
sponsibility of the taxpayers if and until an adoption can be
arranged.
If a physician is negligent in screening a prospective sur-
rogate mother and the infant is born with a genetic defi-
ciency, would a cause of action for malpractice exist against
the attending physician?56 Or, suppose a surrogate decides to
keep the contract baby. Could she in turn sue the biological
father for child support?57 As a practical matter, financial
support by the biological father would be in the best interest
of both the child and the state. One trial court has decreed
that the biological surrogate mother, who had insufficient
funds to support herself and the child, had a right to keep
the child. 8
55. See generally Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in
Prenatal Care, 67 VA. L. REv. 1051 (1981).
56. See also supra note 14.
57. The only recorded "change of mind" case covered the surrogate's desire to
keep her biological child. No support issue was raised. Searchfor a Surrogate, TIME,
June 22, 198 1, at 71. For further discussion of this case see infra note 58. See gener-
all), Curtis, The Psychological Parent Doctrine in Custody Disputes Between Foster Par-
ents and Biological Parents, 16 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 149 (1980).
58. The first known incident of a surrogate mother attempting to rescind her con-
tract was decided recently by a superior court judge in Los Angeles, California. The
plaintiff and his wife were unable to have a family and contracted with a California
widow, mother of three children, to be artificially inseminated by plaintiff. Although
not paid for her services, the surrogate's medical expenses were covered. During the
pregnancy, the surrogate changed her mind and expressed her intent to keep the fetus
when born. Plaintiff then sued for custody, but before trial, he requested the presid-
ing judge to withdraw the suit. Claiming the "extraordinary publicity" concerning
the fact that his wife was a transsexual would make it difficult for his son to "lead a
normal life," the plaintiff capitulated. The infant was given his birth mother's sur-
name, but despite being listed on the birth certificate as the father, the plaintiff was
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D. Emerging Case Law
In Doe v. Kelley, 59 a Michigan couple brought suit to de-
clare unconstitutional a state statute6 0 prohibiting the ex-
change of money or other consideration for independently
placing a child for adoption. The couple, John and Jane
Doe, entered into a contract with John's secretary, Mary
Roe, in which she would be artificially inseminated with
John's sperm for $5,000 plus medical expenses.6' Jane Doe
was incapable of bearing children. John and Jane argued
that the statute impermissibly infringed upon their constitu-
tional right to privacy.62
In rejecting the plaintifi's claim, the Michigan Court of
Appeals first acknowledged that under Maher v. Roe,63 "the
decision to bear or beget a child has. . . been found to be a
granted no visitation rights. The plaintiff's attorney opined that plaintiff might wish
to re-open the case on the issue of visitation rights. The presiding judge of the court
stated his belief that surrogates should always be allowed to reconsider and change
their minds regarding such contracts. Search for a Surrogate, TimE, June 22, 1981, at
71. See also Surrogate Mother Wins Custody of Baby, Wash. Post, June 5, 1981, at A6,
col. 1; Reluctant Surrogate Mother, Wash. Post, Apr. 7, 1981, at A7, cols. 1-2; Ma-
thews, Adoptive Parents Fight Surrogate Motherfor Baby, Wash. Post, Mar. 23, 1981,
at 7A, col. 6.
59. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
60. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 710.54(l)(a) (1983) is identical to the statute at-
tacked in Kelley and provides in relevant part: "Except for charges and fees approved
by the court, a person shall not offer, give, or receive any money or other considera-
tion or thing of value in connection with any of the following: (a) the placing of a
child for adoption."
61. The agreement provided:
(a) That JANE DOE and JOHN DOE will pay MARY ROE a sum of
money in consideration for her promise to bear and deliver JOHN DOE's
child by means of artificial insemination.
(b) That a licensed physician will conduct the artificial insemination pro-
cess.
(c) That prior to the delivery of said child, JOHN DOE will file a notice of
intent to claim paternity.
(d) That at the time the child is born, JOHN DOE will formally acknowl-
edge the paternity of said child.
(e) That MARY ROE will acknowledge that JOHN DOE is the father of
said child.
(f) That MARY ROE will consent to the adoption of said child by JOHN
DOE and JANE DOE.
Kelley, 106 Mich. App. at - 307 N.W.2d at 440.
62. Id.
63. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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fundamental interest protected by the right of privacy. '64
However, the court did not see that right as a bar to state
interference in the plaintiffs' contract.65 The court reasoned
that the disputed statute did not directly prohibit John Doe
and Mary Roe from having the child as planned.66 Instead,
it viewed the statute as precluding "plaintiffs from paying
consideration in conjunction with their use of the state's
adoption process. ' 67 This was, the court said, an attempt to
use the adoption code in order to change the legal status of
the child, particularly the child's right to support and intes-
tate succession.68 The court did not see "this goal as within
the realm of fundamental interests protected by the right to
privacy from reasonable governmental regulation. 69
On November 9, 1980, in the Louisville, Kentucky area,
the birth of a baby born to a surrogate mother under contract
was first recorded.70 The following April, the infant was le-
gally adopted by the biological father and his wife. While
the identity of the new parents was not disclosed, the facts
show that an Illinois housewife had been paid to carry the
child of her artificial insemination from a married man's se-
men. Ninety days after birth, as required by Kentucky
law,7' the biological father's wife had petitioned to adopt the
infant. Her attorney argued that the adoption order, which
had been obtained on the petition, was final and that a law-
suit maintained by the Attorney General of Kentucky chal-
lenging the legality of the surrogate contract should have no
effect.72 Presumably, the attorney general based his action
on a statutory provision prohibiting advertising or soliciting
children for adoption and accepting remuneration for the
64. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. at -, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Wash. Post, Apr. 24, 1981 at A12, col. 1. The first recorded incident of surro-
gate motherhood birth took place in San Francisco, California, on September 6, 1976.
N. KEANE & D. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 33 (1981).
71. Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.470(3) (1980).
72. Wash. Post, Apr. 24, 1981 at A12, col. 1.
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procurement of any child for adoptive purposes.73 A penalty
is specified for violation of this provision.74
III. ,,EQUAL PROTECTION FOR WHOM?
A. Traditional Equal Protection Analysis
When a statute creates a classification resulting in dispa-
rate treatment of similarly situated people, the equal protec-
tion clause compels courts to examine the justification for
the classification.75  The level of scrutiny to be employed,
however, will depend on the interest at stake.76 Tradition-
ally, the legislative classification will be upheld if it is "rea-
sonable, not arbitrary," 77 and if it rests "upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the ob-
ject of the legislation ... *78 However, if a fundamental
right is involved, a more critical examination of the classifi-
cation is required.79 A higher level of scrutiny then demands
that "the statutory classification. . . be not merely rationally
related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the
achievement of a compelling state interest."' 0
The AID statutes make an express classification between
married and unmarried women. Accordingly, the next step
73. See Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.590 (1980). In addition, the attorney general main-
tained an action to enjoin Surrogate Planning Associates, Inc., (SPA) from making
any further surrogate mother arrangements in the state. Annas, supra note 51, at 23,
25. See also Note, In Defense of Surrogate Parenting: A CriticalAnalysis of the Recent
Kentucky Experience, 69 Ky. L.J. 877 (1980-198 1).
The surrogate received less than $10,000 for her services. The issue born of this
arrangement thus became the first born through the work of SPA. SPA was founded
in January, 1980, in Louisville, Kentucky, and it operates as a match-maker, match-
ing infertile couples with fertile women willing to bear babies. SPA estimates the
average cost involved in a total surrogate program to be anywhere from $13,000 to
$20,000. This covers medical and hospital expenses and the fees of SPA. Krucoff,
supra note 48. See also Note, In Defense of Surrogate Parenting: A CriticalAnalysis of
the Recent Kentucky Experience, 69 KY. L.J. 877 (1980-81).
74. See Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.990(2) (1980).
75. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 587 (2d ed.
1983).
76. See generally id. at 590-94.
77. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
78. Id. at 415; accord City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
79. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
80. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972) (emphasis in original). See
also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
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in the analysis is determining whether the right affected by
the classification is fundamental. If the right is "explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution," 81 it will be
deemed fundamental,82 and the strict scrutiny standard will
apply. Or the strict scrutiny standard will apply if the classi-
fication involves a suspect class.83
But equal protection arguments are an inappropriate ba-
sis for those seeking to protect informal, illicit relation-
ships.8 4 Legal distinctions between married and unmarried
persons are justified when the state seeks to protect and reg-
ulate marriage as a social institution, as well as to maintain
and validate legitimate individual interests, such as property,
taxation, contracts and torts, which are inherent in every
marital relationship.85
Recently, a number of commentators have suggested that
an unmarried woman's right to AID may derive from a lib-
eral reading of Supreme Court decisions establishing funda-
mental rights to procreation and privacy. 86 The following
discussion summarizes the points of view presented in those
cases.
As society evolves and changes, so do many of its val-
ues.87 Automony, self-representation, personhood, identity,
intimacy and dignity are all essential to privacy.88 The ex-
tent to which these essentials play a role in shaping sexual,
procreational autonomy must surely remain flexible; at-
tempting to define them with precision would challenge and
erode any efficacy they might enjoy.89 The right of the state
to control and to shape the behavior of both individuals and
groups regarding the birth of children is always an area of
high emotion and concern.
81. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (citations
omitted).
82. Id. at 33.
83. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-73 (1979).
See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
84. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of fMarriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 541 (1983).
85. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977).
86. See supra note 9.
87. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 892 (1978).
88. Id. at 889.
89. Id. at 892.
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The majority view on privacy holds that private conduct
between consenting adults or, for that matter, personal con-
duct of any nature, should be regulated only to the extent
necessary to prevent harm to others.90 Thus, conformity is
not a priority and is certainly not a value worth pursuing.9'
The opposing view argues that the business of the law is to
suppress vice and immorality.92 Advocates of this view rea-
son that if violations of society's moral structure are in-
dulged and promoted, the whole basis of society would be
undermined.93
Arguably, under the majority view, the state would be
justified in acting to control personal decision making in the
areas of artificial insemination and surrogation for unmar-
ried women. The requirement of harm to others is met be-
cause society could suffer economic harm by incurring
expenses associated with the maintenance and education of a
fatherless child born of artificial insemination. Similarly,
the prevention of harm theory could be invoked in surroga-
tion where the state, by attempting to prevent such acts,
seeks to maintain the dignity and continuity of the tradi-
tional family.94
B. A Basic Right to Procreate?
Buck v. Bell95 was the first case to address what has now
come to be regarded as a fundamental right to procreate. In
Bell the Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute that per-
mitted the sterilization of state institution inmates who suf-
fered from hereditary forms of insanity or imbecility.96 The
opinion, authored by Justice Holmes, was written before the
fundamental right-compelling state interest standard was de-
90. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 57 (1963).
91. Id.
92. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 7 (1965).
93. Id. at 24, 25. See also Dworkin, Lord Devlin and The Enforcement of Morals,
75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966).
94. Using this former view of openness in matters of private conduct, a New
York court recently held that unmarried, consenting adults in private settings should
not be subjected to criminal sanctions for acts of sodomy since these actions were of
no societal concern and promoted no social damage. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d
476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
95. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
96. Id. at 207.
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veloped.97 Thus, it must be determined whether the Court's
opinion implicitly recognized the existence of a compelling
state interest, or whether the Court refused to classify pro-
creation as a fundamental right. 98 The latter appears to be
the case; it has been suggested that the Court's emphasis on
the state's right to promote the general good or welfare ap-
proximates a rational basis standard of judicial review.99
In Skinner v. Oklahoma 00 the Supreme Court again con-
sidered the validity of compulsory sterilization laws. Unlike
the Bell Court, which did not find an equal protection viola-
tion,1"" the Skinner Court struck down an Oklahoma sterili-
zation statute on equal protection grounds. The statute
provided for the sterilization of habitual criminals, that is,
persons convicted of three or more felonies. However, the
statute did not consider felonies which arose from the viola-
tion of prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or
political offenses. 0 2 In its opinion, the Court first recognized
that marriage and procreation are fundamental to both the
existence and survival of mankind. 0 3 It then observed, how-
ever, that for purposes of criminal sterilization, a classifica-
tion distinguishing larcenists from embezzlers represented a
97. Comment, supra note 3, at 1054.
98. Id.
99. Note, Legislative Naivete in Involuntary Sterilization Laws, 12 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1064, 1071 (1976). Writing for the Bell Court, Justice Holmes observed:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who
already sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to
be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with in-
competence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute de-
generate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.
274 U.S. at 207.
100. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
I01. The Bell Court used a revolving door rationale in rejecting the equal protec-
tion claim:
[T]he law does all that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a policy,
applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly
situated so far and so fast as its means allow. Of course so far as the operations
enable those who otherwise must be kept confined to be returned to the world,
and thus open the asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly
reached.
274 U.S. at 208.
102. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 537.
103. Id. at 541.
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form of invidious discrimination.'04 Consequently, the
Court subjected the classification to strict scrutiny and found
it violative of the equal protection clause.
Although a number of subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions have cited the Skinner case as validating, if not in fact
creating, a constitutional right to procreate, °5 it is important
to recognize the precise contours of that right. In both Bell
and Skinner, the Court confronted sterilization statutes.
Sterilization, unlike other methods of control over human
reproduction, is irreversible) °6 Thus, in discussing the pro-
creative "right" affected by Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal
Sterilization Act, the Skinner Court aptly observed that this
"right [is] basic to the perpetuation of a race ....
Given this background, it is apparent that the procreative
right recognized in Skinner was simply a right to remain fer-
tile, and not an uninhibited right to engage in potentially
procreative conduct.
C Searching for a Fundamental Right to Sexual Privacy
Neither the rationale of Buck v. Bell' 03 nor Skinner v.
Oklahoma 10 9 applies to the insemination issue, creating a
new right in the area. Nowhere does the Constitution men-
tion a right to privacy. Nor is any right of sexual freedom to
be found within the gambit of procreative rights recognized
by the Supreme Court. Nor, for that matter, has the Court
104. Id.
105. Comment, supra note 3, at 1056. Indeed, this commentator suggested that
Skinner has been incorrectly interpreted since "the Skinner Court neither denied the
state's right to sterilize nor established a constitutional right to procreate. Rather, the
Court expressly declared that the scope of the state's policy power was unaffected by
its holding." Id. (footnote omitted). See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 685 (1977) ("The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the
very heart of. . .constitutionally protected choices."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-53 (1973) (stating that Skinner makes it clear that the right to privacy has some
extension to activities related to procreation).
106. See Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.C. 1974).
107. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536. Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas stated:
"The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating
effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the
dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no redemption for the individual
whom the law touches." Id. at 541.
108. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
109. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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fashioned a general right of personal privacy which is suffi-
ciently broad to permit sex outside marriage. 110 However, in
Griswold v. Connecticut"II the Supreme Court recognized a
constitutionally protected zone of privacy and invalidated
part of a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contra-
ceptives by married persons.1 2 The protection of this aspect
of procreative autonomy "was largely subsumed within a
broad right of marital privacy"' 13 which "stressed the unity
and independence of the married couple and forbade undue
inquiry into conjugal acts."' 1 4 But it cannot be argued from
this that there must exist a corresponding fundamental right
to reproduce or to use artificial reproductive technology."15
As Justice Goldberg made emphatically clear in his concur-
ring opinion, Griswold "in no way interferes with a State's
proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct."'1 16
Thus, the constitutionality of Connecticut's statutes prohibit-
ing adultery and fornication remained beyond dispute.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird 17 the Court was confronted with a
Massachusetts statute which prohibited the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons. In holding that the
statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court observed that, "[if] the right of pri-
vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child."' 1 8 Accordingly,
110. Hafen, supra note 84, at 538.
111. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
112. 1d. at 485. The Court observed that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance." Id. at 484 (citation omitted). Thus, it is those "[v]arious guaran-
tees [which] create [the] zones of privacy." Id.
113. Note, Eugenic Artfcial Insemination: A Curefor Mediocrity?, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1850,1867 (1981).
114. Developments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L.
REV. 1156, 1183 (1980).
115. Comment, supra note 3, at 1058.
116. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring). But Professor Tribe
states that since Griswold recognized as valid individual decisions not to bear a child,
read as such and considered with Skinner, it forces the conclusion that whether or not
one's body is to be the source of new life, "must be left to that person and that person
alone to decide." L. TRIBE, supra note 87, at 923.
117. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
118. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
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the Eisenstadt Court fleshed out the procreative skeleton of
Griswold at a time when Griswold appeared confined to the
so-called "sacred" precincts of the matrimonial bedroom
chambers." 9 However, this decision did no more than refine
a qualified right to procreative automony blurred by the
Griswold Court's emphasis on the marital relation. 20
In Roe v. Wade'2' the Court squarely addressed an inte-
gral part of the individual's right to procreative automony.
In Roe an unmarried woman challenged the constitutional-
ity of the Texas criminal abortion laws. The Court articu-
lated a new source of privacy derived from the fourteenth
amendment's standard of personal liberty and inherent re-
strictions upon state action. It held that this right was suffi-
ciently broad to embrace a decision made by a woman to
terminate her pregnancy. 22  The Court went on to state,
119. Id. at 454.
120. "It has been suggested that the Court's opinion was lacking in candor, for it
stated in broad dictum a major extension of the 'privacy' right which could have
justified its decision, while purporting to rest on a strained conclusion that the statute
involved failed even the minimal rationality test." Developments in the Law, supra
note 114, at 1184 (footnotes omitted).
Under an expansive liberal interpretation, Eisenstadt has been seen as extending
the right of privacy to all sexual activities of whatever nature. See Wilkinson &
White, supra note 12, at 589. See, e.g., Miller v. Rumsfield, 647 F.2d 80, 85 (9th Cir.
1981) (Norris, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363
F. Supp. 620, 625 (E.D. Va. 1973), affid, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 390, 430 A.2d 570, 583
(1981) (Davidson, J., dissenting).
A more conservative and narrow construction views Eisenstadt as merely recog-
nizing a freedom to decide issues related to the birth of a child. See, e.g., Neville v.
State, 290 Md. 364, 374, 430 A.2d 570, 575 (1981); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,
498, 415 N.E.2d 936, 946, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 957 (1980) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting);
State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58, 68 (R.I. 1980).
121. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
122. Id. at 153. This right, however, is not absolute and the degree of involve-
ment allowed is contingent upon the length of the pregnancy. "[P]rior to approxi-
mately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician." Id. at
164. After this stage, the state may "regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are
reasonably related to maternal health." Id. Finally, after viability, the state may
protect fetal life and "may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, ex-
cept when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. at 163-64.
See also Comment, TechnologicalAdvances and Roe v.Wade: The Need To Rethink
Abortion Law, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1194 (1982); Comment, Fetal Viability and Indi-
vidualAutonomy." Resolving Medical and Legal Standards for Abortion, 27 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1340 (1980) (suggesting that technological advances in artificial life support
systems will undercut a woman's right to abortion since they will push viability closer
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however, that it was not recognizing "an unlimited right to
do with one's body as one pleases ....1,,23
The final case of interest is Carey v. Population Services
International.124  In Carey, the Court invalidated a New
York statute regulating the sale and distribution of contra-
ceptives to minors and stated that "at the very heart of [the]
cluster of constitutionally protected choices" recognized in
the previous privacy cases1 25 is "the decision whether or not
to beget or bear a child .. ,.2. As the following discus-
sion illustrates, this decision is particularly instructive on the
question of the unmarried woman's right to artificial insemi-
nation because it examines the previous privacy cases and
delineates the extent of the individual's right to procreative
autonomy.
Although it has been suggested by some commentators
that since a woman has a right to terminate her pregnancy
and to use contraceptives, aposteriori, the conduct required
to bring about those procreative choices must also be pro-
tected,1 27 the Court's opinion in Carey indicates that this is
simply not the case. First, with regard to contraception and
abortion, the Court made it clear that it is the "individual's
right to decide to prevent conception or terminate preg-
nancy" 128 that is protected. Such unequivocal language
lends little or no support to the argument that a concomitant
right to conceive is also protected. Second, the Court em-
phasized that its decision did not encompass any constitu-
to the time of conception). In a trilogy of recent cases, Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S.
Ct. 2532 (1983), Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983), and
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983),
the Supreme Court analyzed in light of Roe two state statutes and one city ordinance
regulating the performance of abortions.
123. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. In support of this proposition the Court cited Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), which led one commentator to observe: "As it is difficult to
imagine a more substantial interference with procreation than compulsory steriliza-
tion, the limited stature of the recognized procreative 'right' is apparent." Note, supra
note 113, at 1868.
124. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (plurality opinion).
125. In addition to the privacy cases already discussed in this article, the Court
cited Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
126. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
127. Kritchevsky, supra note 9, at 27-28.
128. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 (emphasis added).
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tional questions raised by state statutes regulating either
sexual freedom or adult sexual relations. 29 This reading of
Carey is supported by a later decision of the Court in which
it stated that if the "right to procreate means anything at all,
it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in
which the state . . . allows sexual relations legally to take
place."'130 The lesson from the Court's decisions in Skinner,
Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe and Carey is plain: "procreative
autonomy includes both the right to remain fertile and the
right to avoid conception,"' 13' but nothing more.
D. The Level of Scrutiny and the State's
Justification for Action
Since the unmarried woman's decision to be artificially
inseminated does not fall within the gambit of any recog-
nized fundamental right, state statutes limiting this procrea-
tive technology to married women may "be sustained under
the less demanding test of rationality .. ,,2 Under this
test, the distinction drawn must merely be "rationally re-
lated" to a "constitutionally permissible" objective. 133  In
employing this rather relaxed standard, courts must be sensi-
tive to the fact "that the drawing of lines that create distinc-
tions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable
one."
13 4
129. Id. at 688 n.5. See generally Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68
n.15 (1973), Annot., 20 A.L.R. 4TH 1009 (1983) (implication that state fornication
statutes do not violate the federal constitution). But see State v. Saunders, 75 N.J.
200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977) (holding that fornication statute affects by its very nature
personal choice and that it infringes upon the right of privacy).
130. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978). Cf Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney For Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), af'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976)
(summary affirmance of three-judge district court decision holding that the state of
Virginia could constitutionally apply its sodomy statute to private sexual conduct be-
tween consenting male adults). See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). A noted constitutional law scholar, however, has suggested
that the precedential value of the court's summary affirmance in Doe may "stand for
relatively little." L. TRIBE, supra note 87, at 943.
131. Developments in the Law, supra note 114, at 1185. See also Wilkinson &
White, supra note 12, at 591-94.
132. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977).
133. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
134. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
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Absent a suspect classification or the infringement of a
fundamental right, the Supreme Court has recognized that
legislation "protecting legitimate family relationships," as
well as both the regulation and protection of the family unit,
are "venerable" concerns of the state.1 35 Statutes limiting
the availability of artificial insemination to married women
fall squarely within this classification.
As early as 1888, the Court recognized marriage as "the
foundation of the family and society, without which there
would be neither civilization nor progress."'' 36 Recently, the
Court observed that "a decision to marry and raise the child
in a traditional family setting must receive . . . protec-
tion." 1 37 Thus, although certain aspects of an individual's
right to procreative autonomy have been lawfully separated
from the familial and marital relationship, the Court has
also implicitly recognized that, whenever possible, childrear-
ing should take place within the traditional family unit.138
An unmarried woman's decision to seek artificial insemina-
tion goes against the tide of these pronouncements.
Adoption laws offer an instructive analogy. Like statutes
regulating artificial insemination, adoption statutes are
rooted in state law.' 39 Although all states currently allow
adoption by unmarried adults,"'4° it occurs only in rare cases.
In Adoption of H. 141 both an unmarried middle-aged woman
and a young couple sought to adopt a thirteen-month-old
child. In rejecting the unmarried woman's application, the
court observed:
Adoption by a single person has generally and in this
Court's experience been sought and approved only in ex-
ceptional circumstances, and in particular for the hard-to-
place child for whom no desirable parental couple is avail-
135. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972) (citation
omitted).
136. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
137. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
138. Seegeneraly Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
139. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Finch, 310 F. Supp. 1251 (D.S.C. 1970); In re Jarboe's
Estate, 235 F. Supp. 505 (D.D.C. 1964).
140. Kritchevsky, supra note 9, at 3 1.
141. 69 Misc. 2d 304, 330 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1972).
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able. In the universal view of both experts and laymen,
while one parent may be better than none for the hard-to-
place child, joint responsibility by a father and a mother
contributes to the child's physical, financial, and psychic
security as well as his emotional growth. This view is more
than a matter of present convention, anthropologists point-
ing out that the institution of marriage, which is a method
of signifying commitment to such joint responsibility,
evolved in response to the need for two-parent care of
children. 42
This observation applies with equal force to the artificial in-
semination of unmarried women. 143 Indeed, if a state may
reasonably regulate unmarried adults in their quest to adopt
children, it may be contradictory to suggest that the state
could not regulate an unmarried individual's use of a procre-
ative technology designed to bring children into the world.
More importantly, however, the unmarried woman's ac-
cess to artificial insemination and, thus, surrogation, directly
undermines "[t]he basic foundation of the family in our soci-
ety, the marriage relationship . . . ."44 The desirability of
having a child reared within a traditional family unit has
been repeatedly recognized by the courts. 145 Moreover, it is
clear that "[w]ithin the traditional model, marriage serves as
142. Id. at 314, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 245 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Smith v. Organiza-
tion of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). In upholding the
statutory and regulatory procedures for the removal of foster children from foster
homes, the Court observed in Smith: "Whatever liberty interest might otherwise exist
im the foster family as an institution, that interest must be substantially attenuated
where the proposed removal from the foster family is to return the child to his natural
parents." Id. at 846-47.
143. One commentator has argued that the AI process in fact makes
it less likely that the parent will be indigent or emotionally unfit to care for the
child . . . . First, because the procedure of Al itself is expensive, its use
would tend to be limited to the nonindigent. Second, prospective Al mothers
. . . receive screening and counseling to ensure that they are fit to become
parents. . . . Third. . . use of Al guarantees that the child be born into a
home that sincerely wants it, and there is no reason to believe that this is less
true in the single parent than the dual parent home. . . . [Finally, since a
woman refused AI remains free to choose to conceive through sexual inter-
course, any state rationale arguing that eliminating Al will protect it
financially or will protect children is irrational.
Kritchevsky, supra note 9, at 29.
144. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 843 (1977).
145. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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the genesis of the family .. ." I" Accordingly, both the in-
herent procreative potential of this union 147 and the stability
to the social fabric it provides 48 would be dealt a fatal blow
by either permitting unmarried women to be artificially in-
seminated or permitting them to act as surrogate mothers.149
Equally unpersuasive is an argument that a state is painting
with too broad a brush when it limits Al to married couples.
Although the Supreme Court has failed to formulate a con-
crete definition of the family, Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land 5 0 "represents the only clear extension of protection
[routinely afforded the nuclear family] to a quasi-familial
group."'' In Moore a zoning ordinance which limited an
area to single family dwellings was challenged by a woman
who shared her home with her two grandsons. The Court
recognized that the extended family occupies a place in
American tradition similar to that of the nuclear family and,
thus, is to be guaranteed protection by the Constitution. 5 2
As the procreation and privacy cases illustrate by analogy,
although a mother and her offspring may find protection
within the nuclear family structure, this does not imply a
right to freely bring about that condition, nor does it demon-
strate that the limitations placed on AI with respect to un-
146. Developments in the Law, supra note 114, at 1270.
147. Along these lines it has been suggested that
artificial insemination, if approved and encouraged by the state, tends to upset
the traditional, totally private, monogamous method of human reproduction.
By sanctioning the intervention of a third party (the donor) into the process,
the state is approving a trend toward treating reproduction as a social as op-
posed to a private act. Artificial insemination also creates a potential for direct
state intervention into the reproductive process.
Kindregan, supra note 5, at 1409.
148. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
149. One commentator recently suggested that a clearer understanding of the
family-marriage-procreation cases can be attained by focusing on the right to freedom
of intimate association underlying those decisions. Karst, supra note 12, at 625. Ac-
cording to Professor Karst, procreation is considered fundamental because it
"strongly implicates the values of intimate association, particularly the values of car-
ing and commitment, intimacy, and self-identification." Id. at 640. See also Note,
supra note 113, at 1869. None of these values is present in the unmarried woman's
desire to Al, thus lending further support to a state's legitimate interest in limiting AI
to married women.
150. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
151. Developments in the Law, supra note 114, at 1272.
152. Moore, 431 U.S. at 504.
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married women are in any way irrational. Thus, an
expanded definition of family is required in order to contend
that statutes limiting AI to married women are not rationally
related to a constitutionally permissible objective. The line
of demarcation may be drawn imprecisely, but the Constitu-
tion is not offended "simply because the classification 'is not
made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it re-
sults in some inequality.' 153
IV. CONCLUSION
The legal system, by protecting relationships such as kin-
ship and formal marriage, promotes not only the interests of
the parties involved, but the interests of society in social and
political structures which ensure a long-term individual view
of liberty.' 54 As one legal commentator remarked:
[T]he structure of marriage and kinship responds to that
social interest by maximizing the interest of children and
society in a stable family environment; by ensuring a so-
cialization process and an attitude toward personal obliga-
tion that maximizes democracy's interest in the voluntary
"public virtue" of its citizens; by maintaining marriage and
kinship as legally recognizable structures that mediate be-
tween the individual and the State, thereby limiting gov-
ernmental power; and by maintaining sources of objective
jurisprudence that will ensure stable personal expectations
and encourage generality of laws, thereby minimizing the
arbitrary power of the state. In these ways, the structure of
formal family life emphasizes that sense of "ordered lib-
erty" necessary to achieve individual liberty as a long
range objective.'55
In judicial decisions affording familial and marriage re-
lationships a higher degree of constitutional protection, tra-
dition has played a pivotal role. In the procreative field, the
Supreme Court has carved out a limited degree of automony
for the individual. As this article has demonstrated, a wo-
man's fundamental right to privacy or procreation does not
encompass a right to Al or to surrogation. Accordingly, stat-
153. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v. Natu-
ral Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
154. Hafen, supra note 84, at 559.
155. Id.
1984]
MARQ UETTE LAW REVIEW
utes limiting the use of this reproductive technology need
only be rationally related to a constitutionally permissible
state interest. The state's desire to raise children in the tradi-
tional family setting and, at the same time, promote the in-
stitution of marriage and the family is an unquestionably
permissible, if not laudable, objective. Thirty years ago, Jus-
tice Frankfurter cautioned: "Children have a very special
place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories and
their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious rea-
soning if uncritically transferred .... ,"156 State legislatures,
in limiting the practice of artificial insemination to married
women, have taken this advice to heart. The extended use
and application of this procedure through surrogation must
be strictly controlled by legislative design. Surrogation
should be limited to married women who have gained their
husband's consent, and then, only under proper medically
supervised conditions. As a medical aid to infertility, surro-
gation should be allowed only as an adjunct to medical
treatment of the impediment and not as a popular or novel
experiment.
A legislative program designed to validate, and thereby
license, the procedure of surrogation for married women, as
well as the married surrogates participating therein, should
seek to not only protect the health and well-being of the is-
sue born, but also to assure the safety of the surrogate. Ide-
ally, such a legislative program should include provisions
shaping the rights and determining the extent of the con-
tracting parents' liabilities in the surrogate contract vis-a-vis
the infant. Due consideration should be given to shaping the
sphere of responsibility for various types of error which in-
termediaries, such as doctors and lawyers, might commit in
facilitating the process. In addition, the specific policy mat-
ters coincident with the administration of a structured surro-
gation program should be implemented by an administrative
body or licensing board. The Surrogate Parenting Associ-
ates, Inc., of Kentucky could serve as a model for legislative
reform in other states. Their policies and standards for eval-
uating and processing requests for surrogate mothering are
both comprehensive and equitable in their design and
156. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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utilization. 57
The new reproductive biological techniques are of enor-
mous significance for humanity and demand a comprehen-
sive inquiry into the parameters of future development. 58
The legislative branch of government is far better equipped
to deal with this inquiry than the executive or judicial
branches. Thoughtful study and cautious planning are
needed now before the growing complexities overwhelm,
confuse and confound the role of the rule of law in meeting
the challenges of the brave new world of tomorrow.
157. See supra note 73. See also Brophy, supra note 10; Comment, Contracts to
Bear a Child, supra note 10.
158. R. ScOrr, supra note 18, at 221.
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